in their constituent instruments or elsewhere. Rather, subsidiary instruments, such as multilateral agreements on privileges and immunities, sometimes also bilateral headquarters agreements, 7 provide for an unqualified immunity from suit. 8 Many national courts have also regarded such an absolute immunity of international organizations as a requirement under customary international law. 9 Of course, one should not overlook certain recent trends towards limiting the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations. There have been attempts to find more restrictive solutions to organizational immunities. These attempts can be found both as a matter of treaty law, in formulating more adequate immunity provisions, and as a result of court practice. The 160 (1979-1980) . See also the cases discussed in Reinisch, supra note 5, 157 ff, 194 ff. 10 Article VII, 3 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, provides: "Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities." An identical provision can be found in Article XI 3 para. 1 Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, Apr. 8, 1959, 389 U.N.T.S. 70. Cf. Article 3 (1) b) EPO Immunities Protocol which provides for an exception from immunity "in the case of a civil action brought by a third party for damage resulting from an accident caused by a motor vehicle belonging to, or operated on behalf of, the Organisation, or in respect of a motor traffic offence involving such a vehicle." Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European Patent Organisation, 5 October 1973, 1065 UNTS 199, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ma5.html; See also Article IV (1) (b) Annex I to the ESA Convention providing for immunity except "in respect of a civil action by a third party for damage In addition to limitations on immunity as a result of treaty law, also the case law in some countries, in particular in the US 13 and in Italy, 14 has contributed to a considerable restriction of the otherwise almost unlimited immunity from suit of international organizations. Here one can clearly recognize a trend towards an assimilation of international organization immunity to state immunity. 15 The crucial problem apparently remains to find a workable and practicable test for a functional immunity. There is a clear affirmation by member states, national courts and scholars that functional immunity is the appropriate immunity standard for international organizations. This follows as a matter of positive law from the widespread use of a functional immunity standard in the relevant constituent treaties of international organizations. 16 However, the practice of courts interpreting this standard bears evidence of the difficulty of making sense of functional immunity. 17 The traditional view seems to be that functional immunity necessarily leads to absolute immunity as a result of the functional personality concept of international organizations. As opposed to states, the international legal personality of international organizations is generally considered to be functionally limited. In other words, international organizations enjoy legal personality only to the extent required to perform their functions. In a legal sense they are arising from an accident caused by a motor vehicle belonging to, or operated on behalf of, the Agency, or in respect of a motor traffic offence involving such a vehicle." Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency, Paris, 30 May 1975 , 14 ILM (1975 , 855, available at http://www.esa.int/convention/. unable to act beyond their functional personality. Any acts not covered by such a limited personality are ultra vires. At the same time international organizations enjoy functional immunity, covering acts in the performance of their functions. Since international organizations can only act within the scope of their functional personality there is no room left for non-functional acts for which immunity would be denied. This idea has been aptly captured in the notion that "any activity of an international organization is either official or ultra vires." 18 However, it is not necessarily true that the functionally limited personality of an international organization always has to lead to its immunity from suit. 19 Sometimes the relevant immunity instruments expressly mandate a restrictive notion of the scope of functional immunity. For instance, the EPO Immunities Protocol provides that the "official activities of the Organisation shall, for the purposes of this Protocol, be such as are strictly necessary for its administrative and technical operation, as set out in the Convention." 20 Such language only makes sense if there are certain official acts that should enjoy immunity and other activities for which no immunity will be enjoyed. Otherwise, it would indeed be redundant.
In applying a stricter functional immunity standard national courts have sometimes denied immunity to international organizations where they considered a specific activity to fall outside the scope of the functionally necessary. 21 In general, however, they tend to accept a rather broad scope of functional necessity covering, in particular, employment disputes as long as they involve the exercise of functions of the international organization and do not concern purely technical support or secretarial work. See, for instance, the approach of the Italian courts re-introducing a "iure imperii" / "iure gestionis" differentiation to qualify employment relationships with international organizations: At the end of the day, most attempts to make functional immunity work in a way that does not lead to absolute immunity have not been very successful. This raises the question whether there are any alternative solutions.
In the quest for an appropriate immunity standard for international organizations, the paramount underlying rationale of functional immunity, the protection of the independent functioning of the organization, should be kept in mind. It has been observed that this purpose should be balanced against the equally cogent demand of protecting the interests of potential litigants in having a possibility to pursue their claims against an international organization before an independent judicial or quasi-judicial body.
23
This is by no means a revolutionary demand. In fact, it can be easily demonstrated that similar considerations have contributed to the limitation of state immunity.
24
The necessity to treat states like non-state parties if they act like non-state actors, for instance by entering into commercial contracts, has served as a strong underlying rationale of limiting state immunity.
What was then often phrased as a matter of commercial fairness clearly also implied an issue of providing a level playing field: if states chose to enter the marketplace they should do so under the same conditions as other market participants.
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By limiting state immunity to their sovereign (iure imperii) activities and denying it for their commercial (iure gestionis) activities, private parties entering into (commercial) dealings with states no longer faced the risk of being deprived of judicial remedies.
II.The right of access to court
Since the mid-20 th century it has also been the human rights rationale of providing access to justice to private parties which reinforced the necessity to restrict the jurisdictional immunity That the fair trial guarantee includes a right of access to court is also true for the other human rights documents.
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In addition there is a strong argument in favor of the existence of unwritten international law, be it a general principle of law or a customary rule, which demands the availability of judicial or quasi-judicial remedies.
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Such demands underlie the traditional rules prohibiting a denial 26 Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him." GA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp For the UDHR this is confirmed by the draft language of its Article 10 which originally provided that "[e]very one shall have access to independent and impartial tribunals in the determination of any criminal charge against him, and of his rights and obligations." Report of the UN Human Rights Commission, (ECOSOC) Official Records, 3rd year, 6th Session, E/600, Annex A. (Emphasis added). With regard to the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 13 apparently viewed access to court as an inherent part of the rights under Article 14 of the Covenant when it spoke of "equality before the courts, including equal access to courts." General Comment No. 13: Equality before the courts and the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law, 13 April 1984, para 3 available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/bb722416a295f264c12563ed0049dfbd?Opendocument#. See also Nowak, U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (1993) 239.
With particular reference to international organizations and the rights of staff members it has been argued already in the 1970s that the "[...] availability of a legal remedy -as a guarantee of respect for the law -may now be considered a general principle of law in the sense of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court.
of justice as they have been developed in a long line of arbitration decisions in the context of minimum standards concerning the treatment of foreigners 33 and as they are now considered to embody customary international law human rights standards.
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The human rights rationale of providing access to court is equally cogent in the context of the immunity of international organizations: the relevant human rights instruments clearly phrase the underlying fair trial rights as rights of individuals entitling them to have a fair third-party adjudication of their claims against anyone else, regardless of whether the opponent might be another private party, a foreign state or an international organization.
In fact, the necessity for the availability of dispute settlement mechanisms may be even more relevant in the case of international organizations than of states since states can (almost) always be sued before their own domestic courts whereas international organizations usually do not have any comparable internal courts.
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The option to sue foreign states before their own domestic courts in case they enjoy jurisdictional immunity abroad suggests that the right of access to court may also be pursued before different alternative fora. The right of access to court may be flexible enough not to require states to provide always and exclusively their own judicial system. Rather, it may permit them to provide access to either their own courts or to an adequate alternative system of dispute-settlement. In the case of international organizations, which do not possess their own domestic courts, the availability of such an alternative dispute-settlement mechanism will be crucial. If claims are brought against international organizations before national courts and if they are dismissed as a result of the defendant organization's immunity, the forum state will violate the claimant's right of access to court unless it ensures that there is an alternative adequate dispute-settlement mechanism available. This is so by virtue of a customary international rule that is tending to assert itself more and more, that international organizations today appear bound to establish legal remedies for the good of all their personnel and to those who may invoke statutory rules." Bastid, Have the U.N. Administrative Tribunals Contributed to the Development of International Law, in Friedmann/Henkin/Lissitzyn (eds.), Transnational Law in a Changing Society. Essays in Honor of Philip C. Jessup (1972) , 298, at 309.
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Restatement (Third), supra note 1, § 711 Reporters' Note 1: "It is a wrong under international law for a state to deny a foreign national access to domestic courts."
34
Ibid., Comment a: "As regards natural persons, most injuries that on the past would have been characterized as "denials of justice" are nor subsumed as human rights violations." 35 See infra text at note ##.
Such a demand for an adequate dispute-settlement mechanism for claims against international organizations derives not only from a fundamental rights argument. Rather, it seems to flow from a forceful combination of legal considerations all pointing to the same direction and requiring a reconsideration of the traditional absolute immunity paradigm. Broadly speaking these separate streams of legal thinking may be identified as:
A. Immunity instruments calling for the establishment of dispute-settlement mechanisms, B. decisions of international courts and tribunals upholding a direct obligation of international organizations to provide for adequate dispute-settlement mechanisms, and C. the case-law of human rights bodies as well as national courts calling for effective alternative dispute-settlement as a precondition to uphold immunity.
A.Immunity instruments
The idea that immunity should be granted to international organizations only upon the condition that adequate alternative redress mechanisms are available to third parties finds a clear legal expression already in the UN General Convention which provides that "the United The ICJ underlined "that the question of immunity from legal process is distinct from the issue of compensation for any damages incurred as a result of acts performed by the United Nations or by its agents acting in their official capacity. The United Nations may be required to bear responsibility for the damage arising from such acts. However, as is clear from Article VIII, Section 29, of the General Convention, any such claims against the United Nations shall not be dealt with by national courts but shall be settled in accordance with the The inter-relationship between immunity and the availability of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms has also been acknowledged in the concern that domestic courts might disregard their immunity unless they provided for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms for their staff members.
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UN studies have viewed the relationship in a similar way when they assert that the availability of such alternatives excludes a violation of human rights or constitutional standards and should thus lead national courts to uphold the immunity enjoyed by the organization. appropriate modes of settlement that "[t]he United Nations shall make provisions for" pursuant to Section 29." Cumaraswamy Case, supra note 37, para. 66. 39 Amerasinghe notes that in such case "national courts could be induced to assume jurisdiction in such cases. "The jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal is conferred exclusively by the Statute itself. This Tribunal is not free to extend its jurisdiction on equitable grounds, however compelling they may be. At the same time, the Tribunal feels bound to express its disquiet and concern at a practice that may leave employees of the Fund without judicial recourse. Such a result is not consonant with norms accepted and generally applied by international governmental organizations. It is for the policy-making organs of the Fund to consider and adopt means of providing contractual employees of the Fund with appropriate avenues of judicial or arbitral resolution of disputes of the kind at issue in this case, notably disputes over whether the functions performed by a contractual employee met the criteria for a staff appointment rather than those for contractual status. The nexus between the traditional international law topos of denial of justice and the human rights notion of access to court can be found in the ECtHR's in the Golder judgment where the Court held that: "[t]he principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the universally "recognised" state an obligation to waive immunity where such immunity might otherwise lead to a denial of justice.
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In fact, one may interpret the rulings of some international administrative tribunals as an encouragement to individual complainants to raise a fundamental rights argument before national courts in case where they are unable to exercise their limited jurisdiction in staff disputes. 56 The idea of an effective alternative forum requirement was initially developed by national courts in the context of a fundamental rights review of acts of supranational and international organizations. Obviously, there is a difference between contractual or tort claims against such organizations and allegations of fundamental rights violations perpetrated by the organizations themselves. However, in both cases recourse to judicial remedies before national courts is usually barred as a result of the organizations' jurisdictional immunity. It may well be that it was on account of the particular importance of the underlying fundamental rights claims that a more differentiated approach towards international organizations was first developed in that context.
1.Fundamental rights review of acts of international organizations
An effective alternative forum requirement was first and most clearly expressed by the For instance, Article IV (1) (a) Annex I to the ESA Convention, supra note 12, provides: "The Council has the duty to waive this immunity in all cases where reliance upon it would impede the course of justice and it can be waived without prejudicing the interests of the Agency." 56 For instance, in the Rubio Case the ILOAT made the following suggestion: "So she [the applicant] cannot succeed in her plea --which she may plead before a domestic court --that refusal to entertain her case would be denial of due process and contrary to general principles, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969. However valid the principle she cites --that an employee of an international organisation is entitled to the safeguard of an impartial ruling by an international tribunal on any dispute with the employer --the Tribunal cannot but declare that it is not competent." It has been recently affirmed in a decision sometimes referred to as Solange III clearly expressing the Court's willingness to scrutinize acts of European Community organs that threaten to infringe basic rights of German citizens: "Acts done under a special power, separate from national powers of Member States, exercised by a supra-national organization also affect the holders of basic rights in Germany. They therefore affect the guarantees of the Constitution and the duties of the Constitutional Court, the object of which is the protection of constitutional rights in Germany --in this respect not merely as against German state bodies. With regard to the clearly binding ECHR the court rather unconvincingly avoided the issue by reasoning that the Convention "was concluded between fourteen European states only, and cannot be applied to and imposed upon the United Nations." 73 The resulting immunity of the organization was confirmed by the appellate court though it recognized that "in the present state of international institutions there is no court to which the appellant can submit his dispute with the United Nations" and that this situation "does not seem to be in keeping with the principles proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." 74 It is clear that any assertion that the right of access to court would only be hortatory is untenable today. Equally, the argument that an obligation imposed on European states to provide access to court could not apply in civil proceedings brought before such national courts only because the defendant in such proceedings is an international organization whose membership comprises also non-European states has not gained persuasive strength over the years.
Despite of these early non-starters, the idea of an effective alternative forum requirementdeveloped in the context of protecting against fundamental rights violations by international organizations also caught ground in "ordinary" immunity cases where private parties faced this jurisdictional obstacle when they tried to pursue their contractual, delictual or other claims against international organizations. It resulted from a gradual acknowledgement that sweeping immunity provisions exempting international organizations from the jurisdiction of 71 While establishing a persuasive analytical framework to test the legitimacy of immunity grants to international organizations, the Waite and Kennedy decision itself fails to apply its own test in a stringent manner to the facts at issue. 84 In the court's view the requirement of the availability of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms was fulfilled because ESA had established an internal appeals board. It did not address, however, the concern of the dissenters on the Commission that the applicants in the particular case were probably not able to resort to this internal remedial mechanism of ESA. 85 The idea that courts should be guided in their immunity decisions with regard to international organizations by the availability of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms has also gained ground in national court judgments. This is true both for cases where the organization's immunity has been upheld and only a more or less explicit reminder of the international organization's obligations to provide for alternative dispute settlement is made as well as, and even more forcefully, where national courts are guided by the absence of alternative remedies in justifying their denial of immunity.
Manderlier v. Organisation des Nations Unies and
That the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by international organizations must not lead to a total deprivation of judicial protection for potential claimants against such international organizations is clearly expressed in a decision of the Swiss Supreme Court where it described the obligation to provide for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms as a "counterpart" to the jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by them. 
3.State immunity case law
The idea to make the granting of immunity dependent upon the availability of an alternative forum can also be found in a number of state immunity and related immunity decisions.
However, state immunity decisions reveal that the potential friction between a constitutional law or human rights-based right of access to court and the immunity of states or international 93 "Will man nicht unterstellen, daß der Satzungs-bzw. der Gesetzgeber, der diese Satzung ratifiziert hat, das Problem, ob und welcher Gerichtsbarkeit die Beklagte unterworfen ist, ungelöst sein lassen wollte oder nicht gesehen haben sollte, so verbleibt nur die einzig mögliche Auslegung, daß die Europäischen Schulen sich der Gerichtsbarkeit des Landes ihres jeweiligen Sitzes unterworfen haben. Recently, the view that there is no real conflict between the grant of immunity and the obligation to provide access to court was adopted in the English Holland v. Lampen Rather, the particular grants of immunity did not constitute infringements.
Al-Adsani concerned an English decision granting immunity to a foreign state in a case
involving an allegation of torture in that state. The British government -unsuccessfully -argued in the Al-Adsani Case that Article 6 was not applicable because the UK had no jurisdiction as a result of the grant of immunity. See supra note 30.
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"The Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity." Al-Adsani, supra note 102, at para. 55.
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Al-Adsani, supra note 102, at para. 56.
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By a close 8 to 7 vote the Court, while accepting that the "prohibition of torture has achieved the status of a peremptory norm in international law", rejected the argument that a "State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State where acts of torture are alleged." Al-Adsani, supra note 102, at para. 61.
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See in this regard the dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides: "Any form of blanket immunity, whether based on international law or national law, which is applied by a court in order to block completely the judicial determination of a civil right without balancing the competing interests, namely those connected with the particular immunity and those relating to the nature of the specific claim which is the subject matter of the relevant proceedings, is a disproportionate limitation on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and for that reason it amounts to a violation of that Article. The courts should be in a position to weigh the competing interests in favour of upholding an immunity or allowing a judicial determination of a civil right, after looking into the subject matter of the proceedings." Al-Adsani, supra note 102.
Of course, one must acknowledge that also national courts tend to restrict the proportionality test and frequently are satisfied by stating that immunity is a principle of international law and thus any restriction of the non-absolute right of access to court may be justified.
In an important Spanish pre-Al-Adsani decision in the Abbott Case 117 the Spanish Constitutional Court pursued this avenue when it had to address the issue whether an absolute immunity from execution would be contrary to a right of access to courts. The Court recognized that such immunity would be contrary to the fundamental right to a fair hearing by a tribunal, as established in Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution. 118 However, it found that this right was not absolute and did not cover the measures of constraint against the property of foreign states protected by international immunities. In the Court's view the principle of sovereign equality -upon which state immunity is based -was a legitimate ground to restrict the scope of Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution. In a subsequent case, the same court reaffirmed that the fundamental right to a judicial decision and its execution may be limited by legitimate exceptions -the immunity of foreign states being one of these legitimate exceptions.
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A fairly clear echo of the ECtHR's judgments can be discerned in the Greek Supreme Court's Distomo Massacre decisions which involved the issue whether a national authorization requirement for enforcement measures was compatible with the right of access to court. "An interference with the right to judicial protection is allowed if it is in conformity with the principle of proportionality. This means that a limitation must be needed and necessary for reaching a pursued constitutionally legitimate goal and in proportion to the importance of this goal. Judicial immunity reflects the principle of the equality of states and thereby respects for the independence and integrity of another state. This goal is constitutionally legitimate and the exclusion of judicial protection is needed and necessary for achieving this goal. The goal can only be achieved by the exclusion of court jurisdiction in another state. The exclusion of judicial protection in the Republic of Slovenia is also proportionate to the importance of the pursued goal. Respect for the principle of sovereign equality is necessary for preserving international cooperation and cohesion between the states. On the other hand, the complainant is not deprived by the challenged ruling of all judicial protection, but only of such before domestic courts. According to general rules on jurisdiction (actor sequitur forum rei), the complainant may sue the Federal Republic of Germany before its courts, where an argument in favor of judicial state immunity has no value." A.A. (individual) v. Germany (state), supra note 124.
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See supra note 102.
protection, but only of such before domestic courts." The fact that a law-suit might be brought in the defendant state's courts "where an argument in favor of judicial state immunity has no value" was an important consideration for the Slovenian Constitutional Court. This demonstrates an approach mandated by Waite and Kennedy
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-which was expressly invoked by the Slovenian Court -that the availability of an alternative forum is a decisive criterion for the proportionality of jurisdictional immunity under access to court considerations.
The Slovenian case also shows that the state immunity decisions must be distinguished from cases involving the immunity of international organizations in an important way. In all these cases immunity did not totally deprive the private claimant of dispute settlement mechanisms.
In state immunity cases there is almost always, though sometimes rather inconveniently, the option of suing the foreign state before its own domestic courts. 
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A clear reminder of the inter-relationship between the right of access to court and immunity in the sense that the latter will be in conformity with the former only if an alternative forum is available can be seen in a recent Austrian Supreme Court decision involving a foreign head of state. While the Austrian courts held that a foreign incumbent head of state was shielded by immunity from a paternity suit, they made it clear, however, that this immunity was conditional upon the availability of an alternative forum in the home state of the foreign head of state. The court reasoned that only if legal action against an incumbent head of State in his home country is impossible "and due to the State's obligation under civil human rights law to provide access to courts, would Plaintiff be entitled to a decision on the merits by the court, and would a claim to that effect probably prevail over the provisions on immunity." 
4.Other conflict solution approaches
When analyzing the development of an effective alternative forum requirement as an important factor in order to assess the legitimacy of according or denying immunity to a foreign state or international organization one has to recognize that this development is still ongoing and that it has all the characteristics of a gradual process. The development seems to corroborate the New Haven School's fundamental insight that international law is less a set of stable rules than a process of claims and counterclaims with regard to the content of certain normative assumptions. 131 Indeed, it would be hard to argue that either the traditional "no conflict" approach or the modern balancing test can be regarded as the only dogmatic truth. Rather, it appears to be the consequence of a shift of emphasis from a traditional international law perspective, primarily focusing on the dignity of equal sovereigns and upholding a balanced comity among nations, towards a human rights centered notion of international law, protecting the rights of individuals as the ultimate beneficiaries, if not subjects of law. "It is true that in its Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (see paragraphs 23-24 above) the working group of the International Law Commission noted, as a recent development in State practice and legislation on the subject of immunities of States, the argument increasingly put forward that immunity should be denied in the case of death or personal injury resulting from acts of a State in violation of human rights norms having the character of jus cogens, particularly the prohibition on torture. However, as the working group itself acknowledged, while national courts had in some cases shown some sympathy for the argument that States were not entitled to plead immunity where there had been a violation of human rights norms with the character of jus cogens, in most cases (including those cited by the applicant in the domestic proceedings and before the Court) the plea of sovereign immunity had succeeded." Al-Adsani, supra note 102, para. 62.
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"Notwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture in international law, the Court is unable to discern in the international instruments, judicial authorities or other materials before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State where acts of torture are alleged." Al-Adsani, supra note 102, para. 61. Going beyond the framework of national constitutional jurisprudence the French Cour de Cassation considered the idea that according primacy or supremacy to the rules of the ECHR might avoid a denial of justice in the case of immunity granted to an international organization.
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In addition and without resorting to the concept of jus cogens, one might validly ask whether, as a matter of policy, a conflict between the interests of persons enjoying immunity and those seeking access to court should not be decided in favour of the latter. It has been suggested that "there is sufficient reason to argue that the interests of the international organization as the ratio legis of the immunities granted should be subordinated to the promotion of good administration of justice." The acceptance of the modern trend which makes the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations dependent on the availability of adequate alternative forms of redress has farreaching implications. The obligation of international organizations to make available to claimants "reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights" 148 , is not limited to providing a forum. It is also necessary that such an alternative forum fulfills certain criteria as to its effectiveness. 144 The court considered that an organization's immunity may lead to a denial of justice and asked whether "[c]e déni de justice peut-il être évité par la primauté de la convention européenne des droits de l'homme, qui garantit le libre accès au juge et le procès équitable?" Cour de Cassation, Rapport annuel (1995), 418, cited by Byk, supra note 53, 142. 
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Waite and Kennedy, supra note 79, para. 68.
A.Effectiveness as a criteria for adequate alternative means
For an alternative forum to be adequate the applicability of the entire body of law that is necessary to guarantee an effective protection must be assured. In ECtHR cases concerning Beer and Regan, supra note 78.
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Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 57.
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In re application of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, , supra note 58. appears that a determination of unspecified terms like "general principles of law" or "basic human rights" can not be interpreted to imply specific provisions. They are therefore of limited assistance in defining the law applicable to disputes between the staff of international organizations and the organizations themselves.
Despite the fact that external tribunals and internal appeals boards are impeded from any direct recourse to legal sources like the ECHR or national health and safety legislation, the legal sphere in which an international organization was established and exists can not be without influence on the determination of the applicable law. Tribunals like the ILOAT have held that any national law from member states of international organizations is generally not applicable. The position taken by the ILOAT in the these decisions 181 is questionable, since to do so without provision of adequate alternatives seriously limits the ability of staff to practically and effectively defend their rights.
Privileges and immunities, granted to international organizations, cover on the one hand "privileges" with respect to national law and regulations, e.g. tax-law, right of residence, import and export rights, etc.; and on the other hand "immunities", such as immunity from suit or enforcement measures. 182 These immunities have led to a situation where the law which is applicable to an international organization and its staff can not be enforced by the authorities of the host state. This situation arises despite the fact that immunities are granted solely to ensure the unimpeded functioning of the organization 183 , since the organizations themselves have been permitted to determine how the immunities should be applied.
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See supra note 160. The inadequacy of the law applicable in an alternative forum, due in part to the statutes and rules of the alternative forum, and the lack of enforceability of applicable law before national courts, leads to a situation where staff members of international organizations are not able to effectively defend their rights, including those granted by the ECHR. The law which is inapplicable before administrative tribunals can only be enforced before a national court if the organization first agrees to lift its immunity. This in effect requires that the organization, which is a party to the dispute, first judges the case to merit lifting the immunity. In this situation the appearance of fairness and application of accepted judicial standards and fundamental rights in disputes between international organizations and their staff is lost.
B.Assessment of the protection provided by a forum as an alternative means
Even though some of the alternative means for the settlement of disputes between private parties and international organizations, for example appeals boards While judges of the ILOAT were in practice often eminent and well known jurists this is rather the exception for internal appeals boards. held that even a single internal dispute settlement mechanism could be sufficient to meet the requirements of Art 6 (1) ECHR. However, the level of qualification for members of such an instance was not considered at all.
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One might argue, that legal qualification of at least one member of an internal appeals board is sufficient But in a situation were no further appeal against a judgment is granted, this is not acceptable since it does not adequately guarantee the fairness of judgements. In those circumstances, not only the chairman but also the other members should be persons of a recognized high moral character, who must possess the qualifications required for an appointment to judicial office. At least one member of such a board should have significant experience as a judge, and it is of course desirable, that board members possess some practical experience in the field of labour law and the settlement of employment disputes. A failure to meet such qualification requirements will weaken the ability of an alternative forum to meet the requirements of fairness and impartiality and may also bring into question the independence of the board. The ECtHR merely found that staff members of ESA had recourse to the ESA Appeals Board which, according to ESA Staff Regulations, was "independent of the Agency" and had jurisdiction "to hear disputes relating to any explicit or implicit decision taken by the Agency and arising between it and a staff member" Beer and Regan, supra note 78, para. 58. In cases where the tenure of office of judges is quite short, where their service is subject to reappointment and where the nomination of candidates remains under the control of the defendant organization, serious questions arise regarding the independence and impartiality of an appointed judge or member of an internal appeals board. 202 A further factor that may influence the independence and impartiality of alternative means, such as the ILOAT, is their reliance upon the "client" organizations. For example, the ILOAT is financed by fees paid by the client organizations on a per case basis. 203 Although there are 44 organizations which currently use the ILOAT over 61% of the current case load is distributed over only 6 organizations.
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Of these, two stand out particularly, the European Patent Office (19.5%), and World Health Organization (15.7%).
Furthermore, many of the organizations which use the UNAT and ILOAT are not bound to these alternative means, and may change between these Tribunals, or establish their own internal means. For the larger organizations this could represent and viable alternative.
2.Fundamental principles of procedure
In the Eurocontrol II case of international organizations" have access to the ILOAT, without having regard to the fact that third parties, such as successors in title to members of staff (heirs, etc.), unsuccessful job applicants and longstanding external workers, may also require access to the ILOAT. Persons other than staff members will not necessarily possess the qualifications, for example linguistic ability, financial independence or the particular legal standing (residence permit, immunity, the opportunity to use a translation service etc.) which may be safely assumed for members of staff of international organizations.
Liaci, an applicant to the EPO, contested the decision of the Office not to appoint him. The ILOAT declared that it was not competent to hear the case since Liaci had not (yet) entered into an employment relationship with the Office.
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The immunity of the EPO left Liaci with no alternative means.
The consequences of such hindrances to access to the ILOAT are strikingly obvious in the more recent case of the Chinese complainant Qin.
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In this case the husband, as successor in title to his deceased wife who had been a member of staff of the ILO, did not obtain an extension of his residence permit for Switzerland. He was therefore unable to promote the (further) review of the case of his wife who had died at her own hand, allegedly resulting from harassment in the course of her employment at the ILO. having an adequate and effective alternative dispute settlement mechanism available has not been seriously tested by either the Waite and Kennedy decision or corresponding national court judgments such as Eurocontrol II.
A closer scrutiny of the actual practice of the most important alternative dispute settlement mechanisms in the context of cases brought against international organizations, various administrative tribunals, in particular, the ILOAT, reveals serious deficiencies with regard to their adequacy and effectiveness. In particular, the mechanism for appointing judges to the ILOAT and the regular denial of oral hearings fall short of internationally required standards of a fair trial, as expressed, inter alia, in Art 6 (1) ECHR. Furthermore, the law applied by these alternative means appears to lack the clarity required to enable an applicant to effectively defend his rights.
Taking these fundamental rights deficits seriously may lead national courts, as well as the ECtHR, to reassess their readiness to accept an unqualified immunity from suit of defendant international organizations.
